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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes
important decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The
purpose of the Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases of
significantly affected earlier interpretations of North Dakota Law, and other
Z otential cases of interest. As a special project, the North Dakota Legal
riting class of the University of North Dakota School of Law wrote the
Review for the North Dakota Law Review. The following topics are
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ARBITRATION-COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
GRA TECH COMPANY V. WOLD ENGINEERING, P.C.
In Gratech Company. v. Wold Engineering, P.C.,1 both Gratech Com-
pany and Wold Engineering entered into separate contracts with the North
Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) for construction services on
the same highway project.2 The DOT contracted with Gratech to perform
construction grading services on a specific project, and the DOT contracted
with Wold to perform construction engineering services on the same pro-
ject.3 During the project, controversies arose between Gratech and the
DOT and between Gratech and Wold.4 Gratech filed an administrative
claim and a demand for arbitration against the DOT and also commenced a
tort action in district court against Wold alleging intentional deception
arising out of Wold's dealings with Gratech during the course of the DOT
1. 2003 ND 200, 672 N.W.2d 672.
2. Gratech, 55 2-3, 672 N.W.2d at 675.
3. Id. at 674-75.
4. Id. 5 4,672 N.W.2d at 675.
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construction project. 5 The Northwest Judicial District Court interpreted
section 24-02-26 of the North Dakota Century Code to require arbitration
and summarily dismissed Gratech's tort claims against Wold, with
prejudice. 6
The North Dakota Supreme Court, interpreting Section 24-02-26, af-
firmed the trial court's summary judgment dismissal, holding that the stat-
ute did apply to third party tort claims arising out of DOT contracts if those
controversies were substantially interwoven, but reversed the portion of the
judgment that dismissed the case with prejudice. 7
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that Gratech's
controversies with Wold were so interrelated to Gratech's contract with the
DOT that a determination on the merits could not be made without con-
sideration of the contract; thus the controversy triggered the arbitration
mandated in Section 24-02-06.8 In Hjell v. Sornsin Construction
Company,9 the court, while considering the application of Section 24-02-26
to third party subcontractors, held that subcontractors were allowed to arbi-
trate controversies arising out of DOT contracts with prime contractors. 10
Gratech expands that interpretation to mandate arbitration."'
In her dissent, Justice Maring noted, "Gratech did not enter into a
contract with Wold agreeing to arbitrate intentional torts." 12  Because
"Gratech allege[d] in his complaint Wold 'intentionally and willfully
5. Id. 4-5.
6. Id. 1, 672 N.W.2d at 674. Section 24-02-26 states in part,
All controversies arising out of any contract for the construction or repair of highways
entered into by the director must be submitted to arbitration as provided in this
chapter .... [A]ny person who voluntarily enters into a contract for the construction
or repair of highways must be considered as having agreed to arbitration of all
controversies arising out of that contract ....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-02-26 (2001).
7. Gratech, 5 16, 672 N.W.2d at 677. The court concluded that "controversies between a
contractor and a third party arising out of any contract for the construction or repair of highways
entered into by the director of the DOT must be submitted to arbitration and the arbitrators shall
determine all controversies growing out of the contract." Id.
8. Id. 17 (citing Valero Energy Corp. v. Wagner & Brown, 777 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that even tort claims, if directly related to contract performance, are subject
to arbitration)).
9. 173 N.W.2d 431, 438 (N.D. 1969) (interpreting Section 24-02-26 to allow third party
subcontractors a right to arbitrate claims against prime contractors).
10. Gratech, 15, 672 N.W.2d at 677 (noting that the statute interpreted in Hjell in 1969 is
substantially similar to the 1999 statute and there is no legislative history suggesting a
nullification of Hjell).
11. Id. 16.
12. Id. 30-31, 672 N.W.2d at 679 (Maring, J., dissenting).
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deceived the Contractor, with the intent to induce him to alter his position
to his injury or risk,"' she concluded that these claims were not arbitrable. 13
CIVIL PROCEDURE-TRIBAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
WINER V. PENNY ENTERPRISES, INC.
Gary Winer appealed from an order dismissing, without prejudice, his
lawsuit in state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.14 His action
arose from an automobile accident that occurred on a state highway within
the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation. 15 The district court ruled
that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the action was brought by
a non-Indian plaintiff against Indian defendants.16
Jerrid Mudgett, Sr. and his minor son were also defendants in the law-
suit.17 Jerrid Mudgett, Jr., who was twelve years old at the time of the
accident, was the driver of a semi-truck tractor, owned by Penny
Enterprises, which stalled or stopped on the side of the road where Winer
collided with him. 18
The action against Penny Enterprises was limited to breach of duties
arising from ownership of the semi because the court found that Mudgett,
Sr. was an independent contractor, and thus no claim of vicarious liability
could stand against Penny Enterprises. 19 Therefore, Winer's negligence ac-
tion against Penny Enterprises was dismissed without prejudice.20 Norm-
ally, an action dismissed without prejudice is not appealable, but since this
dismissal had the practical effect of terminating the action in the plaintiff's
chosen forum, it was appealable. 21 Winer only appealed the judgment for
the personal injury action against the Mudgetts, so the issue regarding the
dismissal of the action against Penny Enterprises was not addressed. 22
The district court's decision was reviewed de novo because the juris-
dictional facts were not in dispute.23 The jurisdictional facts indicated that
the accident occurred on Highway 20 within the exterior boundaries of the
13. Id. J 31, 672 N.W.2d at 680.
14. Winerv. Penny Enters., Inc., 2004 ND 21, 1,674 N.W.2d 9, 10.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. 3 3,674 N.W.2d at 10- 11.
18. Id.
19. Id. 5,674 N.W.2d at 11.
20. Id.
21. Id. 6.
22. Id. 7.
23. Id. 8 (citing Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dir. of N.D. Dep't of Transp., 1999 ND 2, 5 n.I,
589 N.W.2d 201, 202).
2004]
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Indian reservation.2 4 While inside Indian territory, state jurisdiction is pre-
empted by federal protection of tribal self-government and by various
federal statutes.25 This rule applies to civil cases where a non-Indian sues
an Indian.26 "'This [c]ourt has consistently held that state courts have no
jurisdiction over civil causes of action involving Indians, arising within the
exterior boundaries of an Indian Reservation, unless a majority of the
enrolled residents of the Reservation vote to accept jurisdiction.' 27 In this
case, the Indian tribe did not consent to civil jurisdiction of state courts. 28
Furthermore, highways within an Indian reservation are still considered
Indian Territory by Federal law.29
The United States Supreme Court has held that state court assumption
of jurisdiction in cases against Indian defendants arising in Indian Territory
is impermissible. 30 The United States Supreme Court has further stated that
tribal courts have exclusive civil jurisdiction under the infringement test for
two categories. 31 The category that applied in this case was one in which a
non-Indian asserts a claim against an Indian for conduct occurring on that
Indian's reservation. 32 Using the infringement test, state courts have no
jurisdiction over claims if it would undermine the tribal courts authority
over Reservation affairs and Indian's right to self-governance. 33 Thus, the
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. 34
Justice Sandstrom and Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred in this
opinion, with Chief Justice VandeWalle concurring specially. 35 In his
poncurrence, Chief Justice VandeWalle agreed with Justice Maring's
dissent but declined to abandon thirty years of precedence until the United
States Supreme Court overturns the precedence in a factually similar case.36
Justice Maring authored a dissent in which Justice Kapsner joined. 37 In the
24. Id.
25. Id. 5 10,674 N.W.2d at 12.
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Airvator, Inc. v. Turtle Mountain Mfg. Co., 329 N.W.2d 596, 599 (N.D.
1983)).
28. Id.
29. Id. 5 12,674 N.W.2d at 13.
30. Id. 11,674 N.W.2d at 12 (citing Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'n, P.C., 476 U.S.
877, 800 (1986); Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'n, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 148 (1984)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
34. Id. 22,674 N.W.2d at 17.
35. Id. 24.
36. Id. 5 25-26, 674 N.W.2d at 17-18.
37. Id. $5 28, 36, 674 N.W.2d at 18, 20.
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dissent, Justice Maring stated that Winer should be able to pursue his action
in state court because the accident occurred on North Dakota's highway. 38
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE- ADMISSIBILITY
STATE V. STOPPLEWORTH
Milton Stoppleworth appealed his conviction of aggravated assault and
reckless endangerment.3 9 On February 12, 2002, Allen Buchanan was
taken to Jamestown Hospital with a slashed throat and a cut hand.40 While
at the hospital, Buchanan told a police officer, a nurse, and a friend that
Stoppleworth was the person who cut his throat.41 After he left the hospital,
he told a deputy sheriff and a detective the same thing; Stoppleworth was
responsible for the injuries.42
Stoppleworth was charged, but at the preliminary hearing and at trial,
Buchanan testified he was too intoxicated the night of the incident to recall
who had assaulted him.4 3 Buchanan also had no recollection of making his
statements to the police.44 Stoppleworth tried to exclude Buchanan's prior
identification under Rule 802 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence,
claiming it was hearsay.45 The trial court allowed the identification, finding
that it was a prior statement admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(iii).46 The
trial court also admitted into evidence photographs from the hospital of
Buchanan's injuries. 47
Hearsay is defined as "a statement other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." 48 The North Dakota Rules of Evi-
dence state that statements made outside of court by a witness are not
hearsay if the declarant is cross-examined at trial and the statement is "one
of identification of a person made after perceiving the person." 49 Other
courts have interpreted identical versions of the Rule, including Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), to allow prior identification of an assailant
38. Id. 5 34, 674 N.W.2d at 20.
39. State v. Stoppleworth, 2003 ND 137, 1,667 N.W.2d 586, 587.
40. ld. 5 2.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. 55 3-4.
44. Id. 9 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. 5 4-5.
48. N.D. R. Evid. 801(c)
49. N.D. R. Evid. 801(d)(l)(iii).
2004]
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when the witness was unable or unwilling to identify the assailant at trial.50
One of the reasons for allowing out-of-court identifications is that those
identifications are considered to be more reliable than those made in court
due to the suggestive conditions that are present during a trial.5 1
The court, while discussing the hearsay issue, stated it would "'not
overturn a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the
court abused its discretion."' 52 The factors to consider when determining if
a trial court abused its discretion were whether it acted in an arbitrary,
unreasonable, or capricious manner, or whether it misinterpreted or
misapplied the law.53 "Buchanan testified at trial and was available for
cross-examination." 54 Hence, his prior identification statements were not
hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(iii) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence.55
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the prior statements. 56
Stoppleworth also claimed the trial court erred in admitting the
photographs of Buchanan's injuries.57 He claimed that the danger of unfair
prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the photo-
graphs. 58 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated, "'a district court has
broad discretion in admitting or excluding evidence."' 59 The court further
stated "all relevant evidence is allowed; however, even relevant evidence
may be excluded if 'its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice."' 60 The court held that the trial court was cor-
rect in admitting the photographs into evidence because their probative
value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.61 Therefore,
the judgment of conviction was affirmed.62
50. State v. Stoppleworth, 2003 ND 137, 8, 667 N.W.2d 586, 588 (citing United States v.
Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561-64 (1988)).
51. Id. 5 10, 667 N.W.2d at 588-89 (citing Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 n.3
(1967)).
52. Id. 5 6, 667 N.W.2d at 587 (quoting State v. Wiest, 2001 ND 150, 5 9, 632 N.W.2d 812,
815).
53. Id. at 588 (citing Wiest, 5 9).
54. Id. 11, 667 N.W.2d at 589.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. 12.
58. Id.
59. Id. 13 (quoting State v. Klose, 2003 ND 39, $ 28, 657 N.W.2d 276, 284).
60. Id. (quoting Klose, T 28 (quoting N.D. R. Evid. 403)).
61. Id. 14.
62. Id. $15,667 N.W.2d at 590.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE--SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
STATE V. FIELDS
Christopher Fields was pulled over on May 28, 2002, at 3:24 a.m. for
driving his vehicle with expired license tags. 63 Earlier that morning, police
had been informed that the license plates on Fields' vehicle were expired.
64
The officer was also informed that the drug task force had information that
Fields had received a shipment of drugs a few days earlier. 65 The arresting
officer knew Fields from a previous arrest on drug charges, and according
to other officers and a confidential informant, knew that Fields was con-
tinuing to deal drugs.66
During the stop, the officer asked Fields for his license, registration,
and proof of insurance, all of which was provided except for proof of
insurance. 67 The officer testified that Fields acted nervous during the
stop.68 When asked why he was driving late at night, Fields stated that he
was going to a convenience store to buy milk and cereal. 69 The officer
issued a citation for expired tags, said goodbye, and began to walk away.70
Subsequently, the officer returned to the vehicle and asked Fields if he had
any drugs or weapons in the vehicle, to which Fields responded that he did
not. 71 The officer next asked Fields for consent to search the vehicle, to
which Fields refused. 72 At that point, the officer informed Fields that a
drug detection dog was being called to conduct a canine search around the
outside of his vehicle, and asked Fields to exit his vehicle and stand next to
him. 73 Approximately 30 minutes later, the drug detection dog arrived at
the scene and gave a positive indication on the vehicle. 74 A vehicle search
revealed a loaded gun and illegal drugs.75
Fields filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the
vehicle search, arguing that the evidence found during the search should be
excluded because the officer lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion
to continue the detention after the original purpose of the traffic stop had
63. State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, 2, 662 N.W.2d 242, 244.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 1d.J3.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. 4.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
2004]
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been completed and because the officer did not have probable cause to
search the vehicle.76 The trial court granted Fields' motion to suppress,
determining that the officer did not have probable cause to search the
vehicle. 77 The State appealed. 78
The North Dakota Supreme Court first discussed whether the police
officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify the initial
investigative stop.79 Neither party disputed the fact that the initial stop of
Fields' vehicle was proper.80 The court explained that "traffic violations,
even if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct and,
therefore, provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting investi-
gatory stops." 81 The court used the Eighth Circuit's definition of the extent
of an investigatory stop, determining that it may include,
1) Requesting the driver's license and registration;
2) Requesting that the driver step out of the vehicle;
3) Requesting that the driver wait in the patrol car;
4) Conducting computer inquiries to determine the validity of the
license, registration and driver's criminal history, and to determine
if the driver has outstanding warrants; and
5) Making inquiries as to the motorist's destination and purpose. 82
In this case the officer was previously informed that Fields' vehicle
had expired tabs, and he subsequently saw that vehicle being operated with
expired tabs.83 The officer was therefore deemed, by the court, to have the
requisite probable cause to initiate the traffic stop.84
The court next addressed the issue of whether the continued detention
to wait for the drug detection dog violated the Fourth Amendment, ex-
plaining that once the purposes of the initial traffic stop are completed, a
continued seizure of a traffic violator violates the Fourth Amendment,
unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 85 The
court reduced the constitutional inquiry in this case to two determinations:
whether Fields was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
76. Id. 5.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. J 7, 662 N.W.2d at 245.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. 1 8 (citing United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001)).
83. Id. 2, 662 N.W.2d at 244.
84. Id. 9, 662 N.W.2d at 245-46.
85. Id. 10,662 N.W.2d at 246.
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while held awaiting the arrival of the drug detection dog, and if so, whether
there was reasonable suspicion in support of the seizure. 86
The court looked to State v. Koskela,87 which stated the test for a
seizure is whether, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave. 88 Further, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Beck89 was con-
fronted with a situation similar to the one in this case. 90 In Beck, the driver
was validly stopped for a traffic violation. 91 Following a verbal warning,
and telling Beck he was free to go, the officer started to walk away. 92 He
subsequently returned to the vehicle and asked Beck if he had any guns,
drugs, or knives in the car. 93 The officer asked Beck for consent to search
the vehicle, which Beck denied.94 The officer then radioed for a canine unit
and told Beck that a drug sniff of the car would be conducted. 95 The officer
then instructed Beck to get out and stand by the car.96 The Eighth Circuit
determined that a reasonable person in Beck's position would not have felt
free to leave. 97 Relying on Beck, the North Dakota Supreme Court deter-
mined that a reasonable person in Fields' position would not have reason-
ably believed that he was free to leave. 98
Upon that determination, the court examined whether the requisite
reasonable suspicion was present to justify the detention of Fields beyond
the completion of the traffic stop.99 The court explained that in order to
determine if there was a reasonable articulable suspicion, it considers the
totality of the circumstances, and though there is no neat set of legal rules,
reasonable suspicion did require more than a "mere hunch." 0
An objective standard is applied, taking into account the inferences and
deductions that an investigating officer would make that may elude a
86. Id.
87. 329 N.W.2d 587 (N.D. 1983).
88. State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, 11, 662 N.W.2d 242, 246 (citing Koskela, 329 N.W.2d at
589 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980))).
89. United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 1998).
90. Fields, 5 1t, 662 N.W.2d at 246 (citing Beck, 140 F.3d at 1135-36).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. $ 12, 662 N.W.2d at 246-47.
99. Id. T 13,662 N.W.2d at 247.
100. Id.
2004]
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layperson.101 Thus, the question is whether a reasonable person in the offi-
cer's position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect
the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity.102 The
Court looked to the facts:
(1) that in April 2002, Fields was arrested when drugs and drug
paraphernalia were found in his motel room and vehicle; (2) that
according to other officers, Fields was continuing to deal drugs;
(3) that a confidential informant who had previously given an
accurate tip had indicated that Fields was continuing to deal drugs;
(4) that the drug task force had information that Fields had
received a shipment of drugs a few days earlier; (5) that during the
traffic stop, Fields was acting nervous; and (6) that during the
traffic stop, Fields gave a "suspicious" story about going out for
milk .... 103
In this case, the officer making the stop was actually the officer who
found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in Fields' room a month
prior.104 However, the Court explained that knowledge of an individual's
criminal history by itself was not enough to support a finding of reasonable
suspicion, reasoning that if the law were otherwise, any person with any
sort of criminal record could be subject to a Terry-type stop by a law en-
forcement officer at any time without the need for any other justification. 105
The second, third, and fourth facts all concerned information given to
the officer, which indicated that Fields was continuing to participate in drug
activities. 106 The court determined that there were no specific facts that
connected Fields' alleged drug activities to his vehicle or to his travels on
the night he was stopped, and therefore gave no weight to this evidence in
the totality analysis.10 7 Further, it was unclear whether the information
provided by the other officer was reliable.108
The court also determined the fact that Fields was nervous and his
story was suspicious did not raise the level of suspicion to reasonable suspi-
cion necessary to justify the continued detention.109 The court concluded
that the combination of factors present in the case were not sufficient to
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. 14.
104. Id. 15.
105. Id.
106. Id. 16, 662 N.W.2d at 248.
107. See id. 17.
108. Id. 5 18.
109. Id. 5S 19-20.
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"provide the officer with a reasonable and articulable suspicion that crimi-
nal activity was afoot" and that Fields' Fourth Amendment rights were
violated, therefore, upholding the district court's decision. 110
In his dissent, Justice Sandstrom stated that the majority injected facts
of its own, and applied a standard "more akin to probable cause to test
whether there was reasonable suspicion."'" Further, Sandstrom stated that
given the circumstances a reasonable officer would be suspicious."i
2
CRIMINAL LAW- SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
STATE V. TOGNOTI
Jessica Tognotti was pulled over for driving with her headlights off.113
Accompanying Tognotti in the vehicle were her husband, daughter, and
Wendell Decoteau.l14 The officer checked the identifications of the occu-
pants of the vehicle and found an outstanding arrest warrant for
Decoteau.115 Decoteau was arrested and placed in the police car. 116 The
other occupants were asked to step out of the vehicle while the officer
searched it.117 When the officer searched Tognotti's purse, which was left
inside the vehicle, he found drug paraphernalia."l 8 Tognotti was arrested
and charged with the class C felony, possession of drug paraphernalia.119
Tognotti filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the
search of her purse based on a violation of her Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 120 The trial court granted the
motion after finding that the search of Tognotti's purse was an improper
search incident to arrest. 121 The State appealed.122
Individuals are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures
through the Fourth Amendment. 23 Searches must be warranted in order to
not violate the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding a recognized exception,
110. Id. j 21,662 N.W.2d at 249.
111. Id. 28,662 N.W.2d at 250 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
112. Id. 29-30.
113. State v. Tognotti, 2003 ND 99, 3, 663 N.W.2d 642, 643.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 644.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. 5 4.
121. Id.554,6.
122. Id.T5.
123. Id. 7.
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such as a search incident to arrest.124 The United States Supreme Court has
held that "'an officer making a lawful custodial arrest may search the ar-
restee and the area within the arrestee's immediate control."1 25 The Court
later applied this rule to vehicle searches.126 When an officer makes an
arrest of an occupant of a vehicle he may "'search the passenger compart-
ment of that automobile ... [and] examine the contents of any containers
found within the passenger compartment.'"1 27 The search incident to arrest
rule has been extended to searches of passenger's personal belongings.128
An officer can search personal belongings in a vehicle if he "'[has] prob-
able cause to search for contraband in the [vehicle].' 129
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that an officer violates
the Fourth Amendment if he directs a person to leave the purse in the ve-
hicle and then proceeds to search that purse incident to the arrest of another
passenger in the vehicle. 130 It is a valid search if the purse is voluntarily
left in the vehicle and then searched incident to the arrest.131
When reviewing a motion to suppress the court defers to the trial
court's findings of fact. 132 During the suppression hearing the trial court
found that Tognotti left her purse in the vehicle because the officer told her
to. 133 The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that this finding was not
supported by competent evidence.134 The motion to suppress was reversed
and the case remanded with instructions to hold a limited evidentiary hear-
ing on the issue of whether the officer told Tognotti to leave her purse in
the vehicle. 135
FAMILY LAW-CHILD CUSTODY -PARTICULAR STATUS OR RELATIONSHIP
IN THE INTEREST OF D.P.O.
In In re D.P.O.,136 the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's custody and visitation award in a dispute between the natural
124. Id.
125. Id. 5 8 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
126. Id. at 645.
127. Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
128. Id. T 11, 663 N.W.2d at 646-47.
129. Id. at 647 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999)).
130. Id. T 20, 663 N.W.2d at 650.
131. Id. 14,663 N.W.2d at 648.
132. Id. 5, 663 N.W.2d at 644.
133. Id. 22, 663 N.W.2d at 650.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 2003 ND 127,667 N.W.2d 590.
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parents of a child and the child's maternal grandparents.137 The court
carved an exception to the statutory requirement that authorizes a trial court
to direct visitation to a grandparent of a minor grandchild in a custody pro-
ceeding. 138 If the court found that visitation was in the best interest of the
child and did not interfere with the parent-child relationship, the court may
order visitation even if the grandparent has not specifically petitioned the
court, as long as the parent has been given adequate notice of the grand-
parent's desire for the court to award visitation with the child.139
In D.P.O., the trial court awarded custody of D.P.O. ("Denise") to her
biological parents, with visitation to Denise's maternal grandparents, in a
custody dispute in which the maternal grandparents were a party.
40
Denise's maternal grandparents, G.O. ("Glen") and L.O., ("Laura"), ap-
pealed from the judgment awarding custody of Denise to her biological
father N.H. ("Ned") and her biological mother A.O. ("Ann").141 Ned
appealed the part of the judgment that awarded grandparent visitation to
Glen and Laura.142 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's judgment, concluding that "the trial court's finding that, in Denise's
best interests, she should be placed in the physical custody of her father,
Ned [was] not clearly erroneous." 143 The court further concluded that "the
trial court's award of grandparent visitation [was] in accordance with the
statutory requirements and [was] not clearly erroneous." 144
Denise was conceived during a brief relationship between Ned and
Ann.145 Denise was born February 23, 2001.146 Ann was incarcerated at
the time of Denise's birth, and Ann placed Denise with her parents Glen
and Laura.147 Ned was unaware of the pregnancy and the birth of Denise
until December 18, 2001.148 When paternity tests confirmed Ned was the
father, Ned immediately took action to pay child support and to start
137. D.P.O., 5 1, 667 N.W.2d at 592.
138. Id., 17,667 N.W.2d at 595; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (2004) (requiring
grandparents desiring visitation with minor grandchildren to petition or motion the trial court
during custody proceedings; the court may award visitation upon finding that visitation is in the
best interest of the child and does not interfere with the parent-child relationship).
139. D.P.O,17, 667 N.W.2d at 595
140. Id. 5 3-4, 667 N.W.2d. at 592.
141. Id. 5.
142. Id. 1.
143. Id. 21,667 N.W.2d at 596.
144. Id. 22.
145. Id. T 2, 667 N.W.2d at 592.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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visitation. 149 Six months later, Ned filed a petition seeking custody of
Denise.150 Ann acquiesced to a motion filed by Glen for physical custody
of Denise, but Ann later changed her mind and requested the court to place
custody of Denise with her.151 The trial court consolidated all the issues for
trial on November 20, 2002.152 The trial court awarded custody jointly to
Ned and Ann.'5 3 Ned was awarded physical custody, and Ann was award-
ed supervised visitation. 154 Glen and Laura were awarded visitation. 155
On appeal, Glen and Laura asserted that as psychological parents, "the
trial court's decision [against them] was clearly erroneous because the court
failed to give adequate consideration to the grandparents' psychological
parent relationship with Denise . . . [and] the court arbitrarily disregarded
the expert testimony ... that removing Denise from the grandparents'
custody would be detrimental to her."' 156 The North Dakota Supreme Court
rejected this argument, reasoning that the establishment of a psychological
parent relationship "merely furnishes a justification for the award of
custody to a party other than the natural parent," and "[a]bsent exceptional
circumstances triggering a best-interest analysis, a natural parent is entitled
to custody."157 The court considered the trial court's finding that while a
psychological parent bond between Denise and her grandparents had been
established, a bond had also developed between Ned and Denise.158 "The
[trial] court specifically found 'there was nothing presented' to show that
'awarding physical custody to one of the biological parents at this time
would constitute serious harm or detriment to [Denise], especially if con-
tinuing contact were allowed between [Denise] and her maternal grand-
parents."' 159 In applying the clearly erroneous standard of review, the court
concluded that the "trial court applied the appropriate law in reaching its
custody decision ... [and] the evidence did not demonstrate that Denise
would suffer serious harm or detriment if she were placed in the custody of
one of her natural parents rather than her psychological parents."1 60
149. Id.
150. Id. 3.
151. Id.
152. Id. 4.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. 5 5.
157. Id. 6, 667 N.W.2d at 592-93 (citing Daley v. Gunville, 348 N.W.2d 441, 445 (N.D.
1984); Hust v. Hust, 295 N.W.2d 316, 319 (N.D. 1980)).
158. Id. 8,667 N.W.2d at 593.
159. Id.
160. Id. 12.
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On appeal, Ned contended that because Glen and Laura did not specifi-
cally petition for grandparent visitation rights during the custody
proceeding, the trial court erred in awarding them visitation. 161 He asserted
that Section 14-09-05.1 of the North Dakota Century Code requires a
specific request for visitation be made by the grandparents before an award
of visitation may be granted by the trial court.162
The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that, generally, "it is
error for the trial court to direct grandparent visitation privileges under this
statute that are not requested."163 However, the court explained that the
rational for requiring the trial court to direct visitation only in situations
where grandparents have so requested is to put the parents on notice. 164
"By requiring the grandparent to request visitation through a motion or
separated action, the statute protects the rights of the custodial parent...
giving them notice and an opportunity to voice objection to the
request .... "165 The court held that the statutory requirement that grand-
parents specifically request visitation was substantially complied within this
case because Glen and Laura filed a petition seeking custody of Denise, and
they testified that if they were not awarded custody they "would want to
maintain as much of a relationship with the child as the court would
permit." 166 Thus, the court determined that Ned and Ann were given ade-
quate notice of Glen and Laura's interest in visitation absent a specific
motion. 167
Ned also asserted that the trial court erred because the trial court did
not specifically find that grandparent visitation would not interfere with the
parent-child relationship.168 The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this
argument, determining that the trial court's findings that "the maternal
grandparents had established a psychological bond with the child" and that
161. Id. 5 15, 667 N.W.2d at 594.
162. Id. The statute states in part,
The grandparents and great-grandparents of an unmarried minor may be granted
reasonable visitation rights to the minor by the district court upon a finding that
visitation would be in the best interests of the minor and would not interfere with the
parent-child relationship .... An application for visitation rights under this section
may be considered by the district court in conjunction with a divorce proceeding
involving the parent of the minor child ....
ND. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (2004).
163. hi re D.P.O., 2003 ND 127, 516, 667 N.W.2d 590, 594, (citing Peterson v. Peterson,
997 ND 14, 23, 559 N.W.2d 826).
164. Id. at 595.
165. Id. (quoting Alvarez v. Carlson, 474 N.W.2d 79, 82-83 (N.D. 1991)).
166. Id. 17.
167. Id.
168. Id. 18.
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"the child would [not] suffer serious harm or detriment if custody was
awarded to one of the natural parents 'especially if continuing contact were
allowed between [Denise] and her maternal grandparents . . ."' were ade-
quate to meet the statutory requirement.169 Additionally, the court noted
that even though the trial court found that tension existed between Ned and
the maternal grandparents and that cultural differences were present, the
trial court did not find that these issues would interfere with the parent-child
relationship.170 Thus, in applying the clearly erroneous standard of review,
the court concluded the findings of the trial court were adequate to meet the
statutory requirement that the court keep the award of grandparent visitation
to be in the child's best interest and would not interfere with the parent-
child relationship. 171
FAMILY LAW- DIVORCE- ALIMONY
GIESE V. GIESE
Robert D. Giese appealed from orders of the district court holding him
in contempt and awarding his former spouse, Eva Giese, damages for
Robert's intentional failure to comply with the provisions of the parties'
divorce decree.172 The Gieses were divorced on March 26, 1998.173 The
divorce decree awarded Eva twenty percent of Robert's employee retire-
ment benefits and directed Robert's attorney to prepare an appropriate order
to accomplish the retirement split.174 The court slightly modified the terms
of the retirement division but retained the eighty/twenty percent allocation
of the account, employing the value as of March 26, 1998.175
Robert Giese retired on November 1, 2001, and began receiving
monthly retirement benefits, of which Eva Giese received none. 176 Eva be-
gan receiving benefits March 1, 2003, but never received her twenty per-
cent share of the November 2001 through February 2003 benefits.177 Eva
filed a motion seeking damages from Robert on May 22, 2003, and re-
quested the court to award those damages under its contempt powers.178
The district court issued an order to show cause, directing Robert to appear
169. Id. 95 18-20, 667 N.W.2d at 595-96.
170. Id. 5 20,667 N.W.2d at 596.
171. Id. T5 21-22.
172. Giese v. Giese, 2004 ND 58, 5 1,676 N.W.2d 794, 795.
173. Id. 2.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. 3.
177. Id. 4,676 N.W.2d at 795-96.
178. Id.
[VOL. 80:547
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
before the court to show why he should not be held in contempt of court. 179
After a hearing, the court entered an order on July 24, 2003, finding Robert
in contempt of court for failure to comply with the divorce decree and
ordering him to pay past due retirement benefits to Eva Giese for the
delinquent period totaling $3,610.08 plus interest of six percent per annum
for a total award of $3,826.68 as well as attorney's fees of $500.180
On appeal Robert asserted the district court did not have jurisdiction
over Eva's claim, arising from the payment of retirement benefits to Robert,
prior to the approval of the "Qualified Domestic Relations Order"
(QDRO).181 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that for a court to
issue a valid order or judgment, the court must have jurisdiction over both
the subject matter of the action and the parties. 182 Further, the court stated
that Section 14-05-25.1 of the North Dakota Century Code provides "'fail-
ure to comply with the provisions of a divorce decree relating to distribu-
tion of the property of the parties constitutes contempt of court."' 183 This
statute provides for contempt proceedings to enforce divorce judgments.184
Robert argued that he complied with the decree because the delay in
the processing of the QDRO was due to the failure of Eva's attorney to
timely prepare it, leaving the trial court on remand from this appeal without
subject matter jurisdiction to address Eva's claim.185 The North Dakota
Supreme Court stated that under Section 14-05-25.1, the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction.186 Robert further argued that the trial court
abused its discretion in finding him in contempt of court. 187 The court ruled
that a trial court's findings of contempt will not be overturned unless there
is a clear abuse of discretion, and there was no abuse of discretion in this
case. 188
Robert next argued that the district court erred in calculating Eva's
damages and in not considering the federal income tax ramifications of the
award. 189 The court stated that in resolving factual disputes, the trial
court's findings of fact will not be disturbed, unless they are clearly
179. Id.
180. Id. 5,676 N.W.2d at 796.
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing Albrecht v. Metro Area Ambulance, 1998 ND 132, 5 10, 580 N.W.2d 583,
585).
183. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-25.1 (2001)).
184. Id. (citing Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2002 ND 49, $ 5, 641 N.W.2d 83, 85).
185. Id. 7, 676 N.W.2d at 796-97.
186. Id.
187. Id. 8, 676 N.W.2d at 797.
188. Id.
189. Id. 10, 676 N.W.2d at 797-98.
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erroneous, and that the trial court's findings in this case were fair and
reasonable. 90 Robert further asserted that the district court abused its
discretion in awarding attorney fees to Eva.191 Under Section 27-10-
01.4(1)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code, the court may impose for
contempt "'payment of a sum of money sufficient to compensate a party or
complainant, other than the court, for a loss or injury ... , including an
amount to reimburse the party for costs and expenses incurred as a result of
the contempt."1 92 The court stated that there was no abuse of discretion
here. 193
The district court ordered that Robert pay the damages through his
retirement benefit; Robert asserted the trial court should have allowed him
to make a lump sum payment of the award.194 Eva concurred that Robert
should be allowed to make a lump sum payment.195 The North Dakota
Supreme Court, in view of the parties' agreement on the issue, reversed the
district court order requiring damages to be paid only from the retirement
benefit and instructed the district court to order that Robert be allowed to
make a lump sum payment of the award by a specified date.196Eva requested attorney fees on this appeal, but the North Dakota
Supreme Court stated that attorney fees can only be awarded when an
appeal is frivolous and concluded that, based upon the record, an award of
attorney fees was not warranted.197
MECHANIC'S LIEN-WAIVER OF RIGHT TO LIEN
FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK V. RPB 2, LLC
In First Union National Bank v. RPB 2, LLC,198 the North Dakota
Supreme Court considered a case of first impression in the state, deter-
mining "whether consideration is required for a valid lien waiver." 199 In a
de novo review of the district court's summary judgment, the court affirmed
the district court's conclusion that consideration is not required to waive a
valid mechanic's lien. 200
190. Id. 11,676 N.W.2d at 798 (citing N.D. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
191. Id. 12.
192. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE §27-10-01.4(1)(a) (2001)).
193. Id.
194. Id. 13.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. J 14.
198. 2004 ND 29,674 N.W.2d 1.
199. First Union Nat'l Bank, 5 10, 674 N.W.2d at 5.
200. Id. 59 6-7, 674 N.W.2d at 4.
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Don Hermanson, a painting contractor, provided renovation services on
the Palace Arms Hotel in Bismarck pursuant to contract with Robert
Brown, doing business as RPB 2, LLC (Brown). 201 Hermanson continued
work on the project without payment from Brown on Brown's promise of
future payment "to be secured through refinancing efforts or sale of the
hotel." 202 First Union National Bank (First Union), the mortgage holder,
filed its mortgage on March 26, 2001.203
On September 13, 2001, Hermanson filed a Notice of Intention to
Claim a Mechanic's Lien. 204 However, Hermanson agreed to sign a release
so Brown could sell or refinance, with a promise from Brown to pay
Hermanson out of the proceeds. 205 On October 5, 2001, Hermanson filed a
Release of Notice of Intention to File a Mechanic's Lien.206 Brown
defaulted on his mortgage with First Union, and foreclosure followed on
December 14, 2001.207
Hermanson asserted priority over First Union based on the fact that
visible improvements to the hotel began before First Union filed its
mortgage, and additionally, that his lien release filed on October 5, 2001,
was invalid because it lacked consideration. 208 The district court found the
release to be valid, holding that the plain language of the statute did not
require consideration and that Hermanson could not re-assert his
mechanic's lien. 209
The court determined the case to be one of first impression and first
considered the language of the statute and whether any ambiguity
existed. 210 After consideration of several other states' mechanic's lien
201. Id. 5 2; 674 N.W.2d at 3-4.
202. Id. 5 2, 674 N.W.2d at 4.
203. Id. 3,674 N.W.2d at 4.
204. Id. 4.
205. Id.
206. Id. "The release in pertinent part, stated, 'Hermanson... releases the hereinafter
described property from potential claim to a Mechanic's Lien for any services arising prior to the
date of this Release."' Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. 5 5.
209. Id., 5 6, 674 N.W.2d at 4. Section 35-27-02 of the Century Code provides "that if the
owner or an agent of the owner has received a waiver of lien signed by the person who improves
the real estate by the contribution of labor, skill, or materials, no lien is allowed." N.D. CENT.
CODE § 35-27-02 (2004).
210. First Union Nat'l Bank v. RPB 2, LLC, 2004 ND 29, 110,674 N.W.2d 1, 5. The court
explained that the statute "does not state consideration is required for a lien waiver." Id. (citing
N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-27-02 (2004)). However, the legislative history was not helpful in
addressing this omission because "[liegislative history on this issue does not directly state whether
consideration for a lien waiver was contemplated at the time the ... legislation was proposed or
subsequently modified." Id. (citing Hearing on S.B. 2300 Before the Comm. on Industry,
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statutes, interpretations thereof, and policy considerations, the court de-
clined to add words to North Dakota's statute. 211 The court was also
persuaded that the legislature concurred in the reasoning offered by the
drafters of the Uniform Construction Lien Act regarding the purpose and
validity of lien waivers in the construction industry.212 As such, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that absent specific language, the mechanic's
lien waiver provision in North Dakota did not require consideration to be
valid. 213 Justice Maring, in her concurring opinion, stated that she is of "the
opinion that adequate consideration is required for the waiver of a lien to be
valid ... [however the] representation[s] by Brown [to Hermanson] to
obtain refinancing and that Hermanson would be paid thereafter from the
refinancing funds ... [is] adequate consideration . . ." 214
Business and Labor, 46th Legis. Sess. (N.D. Jan. 31, 1979); Hearing on S.B. 2300 Before the
Comm. on Industry, Business and Labor, 46th Legis. Sess. (N.D. March 12, 1979)).
211. Id. 5 16, 674 N.W.2d at 6-7 (citing Dayside Inc. v. Dist. Court, 75 P.3d 384, 386-87
(Nev. 2003)). In Dayside, Nevada's Supreme Court,
[Riecognized the split among jurisdictions as to the validity of prior lien waivers
contained in construction contracts and whether consideration was required for such a
waiver to be effective .... [T]he court explained Nevada legislation was silent on the
issue of whether such lien waivers were effective, and absent a legislative
proclamation, the court ruled a prior waiver of a mechanic's lien is not contrary to
public policy.
Id. (citing Dayside Inc., 75 P.3d at 387).
212. Id. 18, 674 N.W.2d at 7 (citing UNIF. CONSTR. LIEN ACT § 215, alt. A, cmt. 1,
(1987)).
213. Id. 20.
214. Id. 5 28-31, 674 N.W.2d at 8-9.
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